Foreword

On 1 October 1982, after four years as chief of division at the Swedish Defence Staff, I entered my new position as Chief of Stockholm Coastal Defence. I took over responsibility for an ongoing wartime forces exercise with 4000 men in the archipelago including Special Forces, patrol vessels, mine troops and artillery forces. My first meeting with my new staff was interrupted by a report of a submarine periscope deep inside the archipelago at Muskö naval base. I cancelled the meeting and contacted the regional commander. An intensive anti-submarine operation began. It went on for two weeks. This incident influenced the coastal defence activities for the rest of the 1980s.

We had been anticipating Soviet submarines in connection with an impressive US naval visit to Stockholm in the last days of September 1982. On earlier occasions, Soviet or Warsaw Pact submarines had followed our Western visitors below the surface, also in our territory. We believed the Coastal Defence exercise and our presence in the archipelago would give us an advantage in our battle with intruding submarines.

After a few days of submarine hunting, we were authorized to use our heavy mines against the intruder as long as no civilians were in danger. We detonated mines on 7 and 11 October, in both cases just after clear indications of a passing submarine. The order was not to sink but to stop (or damage) the submarine and force it to the surface. After the 11 October detonation, we received indications of repair works on a damaged submarine. Two days later, we had indications of a submarine once again approaching the mine barrage, but despite full control of the surface, the Commander-in-Chief ordered a ceasefire. Two hours after the submarine had passed the mine barrage we were once again authorized to use force.

As Chief of Stockholm Coastal Defence, I mobilized considerable resources in an attempt to force a submarine to the surface. My task was to rebuff any intruder within my area of responsibility. The nationality of the intruding submarines was not my concern. However, like the Submarine Defence Commission I was convinced that the submarines originated from the Warsaw Pact. Ola Tunander’s research has provided a new basis for settling the question of the intruder’s nationality. This is particularly evident for the above incident at the mine barrages in October 1982. Tunander presents a credible account for the course of events: a Western submarine was released during a five-hour ceasefire. Tunander’s research, presented in this book, is groundbreaking and should lead to a re-evaluation of the conclusions from earlier analyses.

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